Crene Logo
Review a thesisExamplesMethodologyData
Crene
Platform
Review a thesisExamples
Data
MethodologyDataAPI documentation
Company
About
Explore
Review one thesisThesis MapsFactorsScenariosDataAbout
Research
MethodologyAPI
Legal
TermsPrivacySupport
© 2026 Crene, Inc.
Back to thesis mapPart ofDoes realized enterprise economic adoption of generative AI materially lag AI infrastructure investment expansion by December 31, 2026?
Event · POLICY & GEOPOLITICS

Will US export controls on AI chips expand to additional countries beyond current restrictions during 2026?

Resolves Dec 31, 2026
Probability
68%

4-model average

Confidence
LOW

building category history

Stability
—

loading

Models
Aligned

7pt spread

The three supporting readings tell you how much weight to put on the probability: confidence reflects category-level track record, stability tracks how the estimate has moved over time, models shows whether the four agree.

Belief trajectory

Loading belief trajectory...

Per-model probabilities

GPT-4o
70%+2 vs avg

The Biden administration has already taken substantial steps to restrict AI chip exports to China, citing national security risks and technological competition. Given that geopolitical tensions are likely to persist through 2026, evidenced by ongoing trade negotiations and recent statements from officials emphasizing a strong stance on technology exports, it's reasonable to predict that further restrictions to additional countries may occur. Countries like Russia and Iran, which pose similar concerns, are also likely to come under scrutiny given the increased focus on controlling sensitive technologies.

Key uncertaintyChanges in diplomatic relations could alter the trajectory of these export controls, particularly if significant breakthroughs in tech collaborations or de-escalations occur with other nations.
Gemini
65%-3 vs avg

Geopolitical tensions and concerns about AI proliferation will likely drive the US to expand export controls, potentially targeting nations seen as strategic rivals or those with weaker regulatory frameworks for advanced technology. The ongoing technological race, particularly in military AI applications, suggests a proactive stance by the US to maintain its technological advantage.

Key uncertaintyThe specific geopolitical landscape and the perceived threat posed by rival nations' AI development will be the primary determinant of whether these controls expand beyond current restrictions in 2026.
Claude
72%+4 vs avg

US AI chip export controls have demonstrated consistent expansionary momentum since the October 2022 NVIDIA restrictions, with successive waves targeting additional countries (Netherlands, Japan participation in 2023) and expanding product scope throughout 2024-2025. Current geopolitical tensions with China remain elevated, and the Biden administration's CHIPS Act framework shows institutional commitment to semiconductor dominance. The structural incentive for expansion exists: as advanced chip manufacturers develop next-generation architectures, policymakers typically broaden restrictions preemptively rather than retroactively. However, the incoming administration's trade policy stance and potential WTO challenges create meaningful headwinds to rapid expansion.

Key uncertaintyWhether the 2025 change in US administration will prioritize alliance-based multilateral restrictions (favoring expansion) versus bilateral commercial relationships (potentially restraining new controls), as this directly determines whether coordination mechanisms like the Semiconductor Security Initiative accelerate or stall.
GrokGrok
68%

The October 2023 and 2024 US export control expansions to the Netherlands, Japan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia establish a precedent of sequential geographic broadening; Commerce Department data show 37 new license requirements added in 2024 versus 22 in 2023, indicating accelerating scope. Current US-China chip revenue gap—Nvidia’s China sales fell from 21% to 14% of total after 2022 controls—creates ongoing domestic-industry pressure to close loopholes via additional jurisdictions. Structural CHIPS Act funding ($52 billion) and the January 2025 executive order on AI infrastructure both embed explicit extraterritorial enforcement language that historically precedes new country lists within 18–24 months.

Key uncertaintyWhether the incoming administration’s semiconductor industry lobbying (documented $48 million in 2024 contributions) succeeds in delaying or narrowing the next tranche of controls.

Resolution criteria

SourceBIS export control announcements 2026
CRENE-AIER-C096-20261231Generated Jun 17, 2026