Crene is investment thesis review infrastructure. The platform decomposes macro, labor, AI transition, and investment thesis questions into falsifiable components using four frontier AI models (Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok). The system produces three product types: thesis maps (binary decomposition into assumptions), factors (continuous decomposition into drivers), and scenarios (hybrid decomposition into coherent pathways). Cross model disagreement is the primary signal. Calibrated against 1,161 resolved events with a Brier score of 0.114.

How does AI prediction calibration work at Crene?

Calibration applies at the consensus layer, not at the underlying model layer. Crene queries four frontier models in isolation, computes a cross model median consensus, and tracks resolution against a tiered source allowlist. Every resolved event becomes a permanent calibration point. Per tier accuracy, per model Brier scores, and per domain accuracy are computed live and published at https://crene.com/methodology.

What is a Brier score?

A Brier score is the proper scoring rule for probability forecasts on binary outcomes. It is the mean squared error between the forecast probability and the realized outcome (0 or 1). Lower scores indicate better calibration. The no skill baseline is 0.25 (always predicting 0.5); a perfect forecaster scores 0.0. Crene publishes the consensus Brier score and per model Brier scores across the resolved event corpus.

Crene serves investment teams that need a repeatable thesis review process: hedge funds, asset managers, macro PMs, CIO offices, family offices, and thematic investment teams. A team brings one thesis it is actively debating. Crene maps what the thesis depends on, where models disagree, what changed each week, and what would force a rethink. Data and API access remain available as the proof layer behind the workflow.

What is the difference between an event, a thesis map, and a factor at Crene?

Crene has four product types. Events are base binary outcomes with scalar probabilities. Thesis maps decompose binary anchor questions into child situations. Factor maps decompose continuous variables into drivers. Scenarios map long horizon investment questions into coherent pathways across live systems including Empire by Default, AI Labor Transition, European Rearmament, and India as the Third Growth Pole.

Back to thesis map Part ofDoes realized enterprise economic adoption of generative AI materially lag AI infrastructure investment expansion by December 31, 2026?

Event · POLICY & GEOPOLITICS

Will US tariff actions specifically targeting AI hardware imports be enacted during 2026?

Resolves Dec 31, 2026

Probability

36%

4-model average

Confidence

LOW

building category history

Stability

—

Models

Mixed

15pt spread

The three supporting readings tell you how much weight to put on the probability: confidence reflects category-level track record, stability tracks how the estimate has moved over time, models shows whether the four agree.

Belief trajectory

Loading belief trajectory...

Per-model probabilities

GPT-4o

30%-6 vs avg

Currently, the US government has adopted a cautious approach to tariffs, especially under the Biden administration, which focuses on collaboration with allies rather than unilateral tariffs. However, with increasing tensions in US-China relations regarding technology and national security, there is a possibility of targeted tariffs on AI hardware to protect domestic industries, especially as AI becomes more central to economic competitiveness. Historical precedents, such as the tariffs implemented on steel and aluminum in 2018, suggest that specific industries can be targeted for tariff actions under national security grounds.

Key uncertaintyThe evolving geopolitical landscape, especially developments in US-China relations and changes in technological supply chains, could significantly impact this probability as any signs of escalating tensions could prompt rapid policy shifts.

Gemini

45%+9 vs avg

While the US has previously imposed tariffs on technology goods, the specific targeting of AI hardware imports with new tariffs during 2026 is not a certainty. The current geopolitical landscape and the US's focus on technological competitiveness suggest a possibility, but the complexity of AI supply chains and potential economic repercussions make swift, decisive action less probable. The US has been actively seeking to onshore semiconductor manufacturing and has engaged in export controls, indicating a direction that *could* eventually lead to tariffs, but 2026 is an aggressive timeline given current initiatives.

Key uncertaintyThe extent and success of US domestic AI hardware manufacturing initiatives, such as the CHIPS Act investments, will significantly influence whether tariffs are seen as a necessary tool or a counterproductive measure.

Claude

32%-4 vs avg

The Trump administration has demonstrated willingness to use tariffs as a strategic tool (e.g., Section 301 China tariffs, steel/aluminum duties), and AI hardware represents a strategically important sector where the US faces competition from Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung). However, AI chip tariffs would face significant headwinds: (1) US semiconductor companies (Nvidia, Intel, AMD) derive substantial revenue from overseas fabs and would lobby heavily against them; (2) the current consensus emphasizes AI competitiveness through supply chain resilience rather than import restrictions; (3) most advanced chip fabrication already occurs outside the US, making tariffs less effective as leverage. The probability reflects meaningful but not dominant likelihood given Trump's tariff tendency but the specific counterintelligence from domestic tech industry interests.

Key uncertaintyWhether geopolitical tensions with China over AI capabilities escalate sufficiently to override domestic semiconductor industry opposition by mid-2026, similar to how national security rationales drove earlier semiconductor export controls.

Grok

38%+2 vs avg

Current U.S. Section 301 tariffs on Chinese semiconductors already cover GPUs and AI accelerators at 25%, but explicit new tariffs targeting AI hardware imports have not been announced in the 2024-2025 trade rounds; the 2018-2019 Section 301 actions hit $300B of goods yet excluded most advanced chips until the October 2022 and October 2023 expansions, showing a 2-3 year lag between policy signal and enactment. Recent Commerce and USTR dockets list AI-specific controls under export licensing rather than tariffs, and the May 2024 proposed rule on advanced computing items focuses on licensing thresholds, not duties. Mid-term election dynamics and the existing 7.5-25% tariff stack already in place reduce the incremental political payoff for a 2026-only AI hardware tariff package.

Key uncertaintyOutcome of the 2024 presidential election and subsequent USTR appointments, which could accelerate or shelve new China-focused tariff lists.

Resolution criteria

SourceUSTR tariff announcements 2026

CRENE-AIER-C099-20261231Generated Jun 17, 2026